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I. INTRODUCTION 
Vast amounts of undiscovered or incompletely studied cultural 
materials1 from earlier civilizations still exist throughout the world.2 
In recent years, an increasing international trade in antiquities has 
caused many valuable, unstudied objects to be moved from their 
original locations.3 Only a small fraction are moved legally, how-
ever; the majority of artifacts are excavated, transported, and sold 
illegally.4 The information lost through this illicit movement pre-
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I. "Cultural materials" include artifacts from civilizations that illustrate their architec-
ture, textiles, tools, weapons, sculpture and engraved objects. See C. WINICK, DICTIONARY OF 
ANTHROPOLOGY 44 (1970). This article focuses on archaeological cultural materials or 
"antiquities." 
2. See, e.g., G. CLARK, WORLD PREHISTORY: A NEW OUTLINE 4 (1969); J. MELLAART, CATAL 
HuYuK: A NEOLITHIC TowN IN ANATOLIA 24 (1967) (addressing the study of Near Eastern 
prehistoric civilizations); K. MEYER, THE PLUNDERED PAST 185, 198 (1973) (discussing the 
excavation of Mexican and Californian archaeological sites). 
3. K. MEYER, supra note 2, at xiv (speculation in works of art is becoming a big business); 
Coggins, Archaeology and the Art Market, 175 Sci. 263, 263 (1972); Coggins, Illicit Traffic of 
Pre-Columbian Antiquities, 29 ART. J. 94, 94 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Coggins, Illicit 
Traffic! ("In the last ten years there has been an incalculable increase in the number of 
monuments systematically stolen, mutilated, and illicitly exported from Guatemala and 
Mexico in order to feed the international art market."); Nafziger, Controlling the Northward 
Flow of Mexican Antiquities, 7 LAw. AMERICAS 68, 68 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Nafziger, 
Controlling! ("The massive plundering of Mexican archaeological sites, of which there are 
thousands, has been going on for about a dozen years."); Palmer, Introduction, Symposium: 
ljegal Aspects of the International Traffic in Stolen Art, 4 SYR. J. INT'L L. & CoM. 51, 51 
(1976) ("Along with real estate and gold, art more than ever before has come to be regarded 
as a hedge against inflation and a highly sought-after commodity."); Comment, Legal 
Approaches to the Trade in Stolen Antiquities, 2 SYR. J. INT'L L. & CoM. 51, 52 (1974) 
("the illicit international trade in antiquities offers high rewards and has created vested 
interests in its perpetuation" with prices of antique art objects increasing 90-95% in 1973 
alone). 
4. Reinhold, Theft and Vandalism: An Archaeological Disaster, EXPEDITION, Summer 
1973, at 2 (The demand and buying power of the public and museums have "created a hull 
market for ancient art and a flourishing worldwide traffic in antiquities, much of it clandes-
tine."). See K. MEYER, supra note 2; Coggins, Illicit Traffic, supra note 3, Nafziger, 
Regulation by the International Council of Museums: An Example of the Role of Non-
Gouernmental Organizations in the Transnational Legal Process, 2 DEN. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 
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sents a problem of international concern.5 The initial movement of 
unstudied materials from their natural settings causes the greatest 
cultural loss. Unscientific removal irreparably obscures all informa-
tion derived from associated materials. 11 Moreover, careless and de-
structive handling often accompanying the illicit movement of ma-
terials after removal further limits our knowledge and appreciation 
of earlier civilizations.7 It is the unstudied nature of the archaeologi-
cal materials that is at issue here. The dramatic loss of information 
and the rate of physical destruction that accompanies illicit move-
ment separates archaeological materials from other more commonly 
stolen materials and makes their recovery and return difficult and, 
at best, incompletely remedial. The ultimate solution is to prevent 
illicit removal of the archaeological materials. 
The best solution to this international problem would logically 
involve international cooperation11 with national actions" so as to 
destruction, and international smuggling of the artistic and archaeological heritage of na-
tional patrimonies"); Comment, supra note 3, at 52. 
5. See Nafziger, UNESCO-Centered Management of International Conflict over Cul-
tural Property, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1051 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Nafziger, UNESCOl; 
Comment, The UNESCO Convention on the Illicit Movement of Art Treasures, 12 HARV. 
INT'L L.J. 537, 540 (1971). The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-
tion (UNESCO) adopted a Convention concerning the protection of the world's cultural and 
natural heritage. UNESCO Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural 
Heritage, done Nov. 23, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 37, T.I.A.S. No. 8226, (ratified by the United States, 
Dec. 7, 1973, entered into force Dec. 17, 1975), reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1358 (1972) 
[hereinafter cited as 1972 UNESCO Convention]. The preamble states, in part, 
"(dleterioration or disappearance of any item of the cultural or natural heritage constitutes 
a harmful impoverishment of the heritage of all the nations of the world . . . " 
6. COMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH MACHINES, INC., ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY 204, 208 (1971) 
("proper study of a site involves recording not only the exact location of the objects found 
and details of their associations with other objects, but also the countless details he has 
observed while digging, even though no specimens are involved"); G. WILLEY & P. PHILLIPS, 
METHOD AND THEORY IN AMERICAN ARCHAEOLOGY (1958); Coggins, Illicit Traffic, supra note 3; 
Merryma~, The Protection of Artistic National Patrimony Against Pillaging and Theft, in 
ART LAw: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 233, 234 (L. Dueorr ed. 1975); Nafziger, Controlling, 
supra note 3, at 69. For example, the stratigraphic method of determining relative chronology 
and reconstructing detailed cultural information of a past civilization is based on study of 
contextual, spatial and temporal relationships among cultural materials. 
7. Coggins, Illicit Traffic, supra note 3, at 94 (In preparing the face of a stolen "stele" 
for transportation, the inscriptions on the side and back often are cut off and destroyed; stolen 
monumental facades usually are cracked into pieces to facilitate transportation, often reduc-
ing them to rubble of minimal artistic, economic and archaeological value. Stelae (singular: 
stele or stela) are single stone monuments that are usually rectangular in shape and covered 
with writing or art.); Merryman, supra note 6, at 234; Nafziger, Controlling, supra note 3, at 
69 (monuments often are divided for easier transport leaving their pictographic message 
garbled or lost). 
8. Nafziger, UNESCO, supra note 5, at 1051. For a brief summary of the history of 
international controls over the flow of cultural property, see Proceedings of the Panel on the 
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avoid merely shifting undesired movement of archaeological materi-
als from countries with strict regulations to those with more lenient 
rules. 111 Domestic efforts alone, although necessary, are insufficient 
to adequately control the international traffic in art treasures. 11 
U.S. Enabling Legislation of the UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and 
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, 4 SYR. 
J. INT'L L. & CoM. 97, 99 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Proceedings!. 
"[Nlew forms of international cooperation, not controls, are needed to alleviate current 
inequities in art. No single nation can deal effectively with these problems; public and private 
sectors must work together as well as nation with nation." Palmer, supra note 3, at 53. 
Although international efforts can mitigate or eliminate jurisdictional problems involved 
in controlling the illicit movement of cultural materials, the bulk of any enforcement problem 
with any sanction in this area derives from problems in identifying cultural materials as 
stolen and proving their provenance and time of removal. Enforcing criminal sanctions raises 
the additional barriers of proving scienter, at least in the United States and related legal 
systems. None of these problems can be reached, even by international agreements, without 
extensive study of the cultural materials that are likely to be illicitly moved. 
What international agreements can do is eliminate the jurisdictional problems accompa-
nying enforcement of national laws. They can reduce the significance of determining from 
which country specific objects come, by making the laws and procedures uniform with respect 
to cultural materials. International agreements can enhance cooperative study, enforcement 
of the various national laws relating to the control of the movement of cultural materials, joint 
recovery efforts, and pooling of related information. 
9. The basic remedy available to foreign nations seeking to control and deter the exporta-
tion of cultural materials owned by that nation is their own laws. For instance, each country 
could explicitly declare national ownership of all non-privately owned cultural materials. 
Such foreign laws are, however, likely to exacerbate the black market problem. For further 
discussion, see Macrory, The Pre Columbian Art Caper, DISTRICT LAw., Summer 1977, at 19, 
23. 
10. K. MEYER, supra note 2, at 168 (quoting a personal communication from columnist 
J. Alsop: "In addition, pre-Columbian objects also command very high prices in Europe, 
especially in Germany and Switzerland. Unless a self-denying ordinance is truly interna-
tional, in fact, it will merely have the effect of denying the United States what other people 
will then snap up."); Nafziger, Controlling, supra note 3, at 77; Comment, supra note 3. See 
K. MEYER, supra at 169 ("[Tlhe Japanese dealers and collectors are going through the art 
market like voracious, but undiscriminating vacuum cleaners."); Merryman, supra note 6, 
at 241 ("It is abundantly clear that national laws [like those of Italy! do not effectively 
prevent or control the international traffic in art treasures and antiquities."); Comment, 
supra note 5, at 555 ("Acceptance [of the 1970 UNESCO Convention I by only a few countries 
may only · divert the flow of illicitly exported goods from ratifying to non-ratifying coun-
tries."); Comment, supra note 3, at 51 n.1 (noting that the cities of London, Paris, Tokyo 
and Zurich are significant centers of trade of stolen antiquities); Proceedings, supra note 8, 
at 111, 119. 
11. SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, IMPORTATION OF PRE-COLUMBIAN SCULPTURE AND MURALS; 
CUSTOMS PORT SECURITY; JUDICIAL REVIEW IN COUNTERVAILING DUTY CASES, S. REP. No. 1221, 
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT, IMPORTATION!; Nafziger, 
Controlling, supra note 3, at 77 (multinational treaties are necessary to prevent a simple 
diversion of the materials from the United States to other countries); Nafziger, !COM, supra 
note 4, at 232 ("Most countries have their own legal controls over international traffic in art 
treasures. It is clear, nevertheless, that by themselves, domestic government controls, hased 
upon criminal and antiquity laws, civil suits, policing of sites, border controls, taxation, 
3
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Every nation has cultural materials which together form man's cul-
tural heritage. The ultimate movements of these materials is itself 
often international. The irreparable damage caused by the initial 
illicit movement of cultural materials is an international problem 
requiring an international solution. 
International efforts to reduce the illicit movement of cultural 
materials have taken several forms, but, to date, none has ade-
quately controlled the illicit movement of cultural materials. 12 The 
United Nations, through the United Nations Educational, Scien-
tific and Cultural Organization (UNESC0) 1a has sponsored two in-
ternational multilateral treaties to deal with the protection of the 
world's cultural heritage. 14 Unfortunately, only the UNESCO Con-
duties, tariffs and the like are insufficient." (footnotes omitted)). For a detailed discussion 
of the designing, development, and implementation of a comprehensive State Antiquities act, 
designed t~ control and enhance the study and movement of archaeological materials, using 
Arkansas legislation as an example, see C. McGIMSEY, PUBLIC ARCHAEOLOGY (1972). 
12. International legal controls to protect cultural materials have been developing stead-
ily hut remain generally inadequate and unevenly applied. Nafziger, UNESCO, supra note 
5, at 1051 (discussing the shortcomings of UNESCO's handling of the dispute over Israel's 
archaeological excavations in Jerusalem). See Comment, supra note 5, at 537 ("international 
control over the importation of such [cultural] property has been virtually nonexistent"). 
13. Alpert, The Role of UNESCO in the Protection of Artistic National Patrimony 
Against Pillage and Theft, in ART LAW: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 269 (L. Duboff ed. 
1975). Two of the stated purposes of UNESCO are to "give fresh impulse to popular education 
and to the spread of culture" and to "maintain, increase and diffuse knowledge; by assuring 
the conservation and protection of the world's inheritance of ... works of art and monuments 
of history and science, and . . . by encouraging cooperation among the nations in all branches 
of intellectual activity . . . . " Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organisation, art. I (2), done Nov. 16, 1945, 61 Stat. 2495, T.I.A.S. No. 1580, 4 
U.N.T.S. 275 (entered into force Nov. 4, 1946). 
Education is also one of the stated purposes of the 1972 UNESCO Convention, supra note 
5, art. 27 (1)-(2) and the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit 
Import and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, art. 10, done Nov. 14, 1970, reprinted 
in 10 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 289 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1970 UNESCO Convention!. 
Teaching about the enhanced value of the materials in situ and about the costs to each 
individual nation of illicit movement of cultural materials is the key to future success. Until 
the prohlem is recognized, it can not be fully treated. For a remarkable example of the 
potential practical effect of education in minimizing the illicit movement of cultural materi-
als, see J. FoNTEIN & T. Wu, UNEARTHING CHINA'S PAST 18 (1973) ("It is in educating the 
Chinese people in a new attitude toward the preservation of the cultural relics of their own 
past and in enlisting their help to achieve this aim that the communist rulers of China have 
heen remarkably successful."). 
14. The 1972 UNESCO Convention and the 1970 UNESCO Convention provide a frame-
work for an international solution to the illicit movement and destruction of cultural material. 
Article 7 of the 1972 Convention focuses on efforts to conserve and identify the world cultural 
heritage. The 1972 UNESCO Convention defines cultural heritage as monuments, groups of 
huildings, and sites, and is limited to these categories of heritage and natural heritage. It 
mandates that each state party to the Convention will identify, preserve, and transmit to 
posterity that heritage to the best of its ability. The Convention then specifies the breadth 
4
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vention dealing with monuments, groups of buildings, and sites is 
in effect, while the Convention dealing with smaller cultural materi-
als is neither ratified by the United States nor yet in force. 15 Never-
theless, several limited bilateral and multilateral agreements di-
rected at particular areas of concern are in force. 16 For example, the 
of efforts to be brought to bear on the problem (legal, scientific and financial measures). It 
states in part: "For the purpose of this Convention, international protection of the world 
cultural and natural heritage shall be understood to mean the establishment of a system of 
international co-operation and assistance designed to support States Parties to the Conven-
tion in their efforts to conserve and identify that heritage." 1972 UNESCO Convention, supra 
note 5, art. 7. For a general discussion of the goals and mandates of the 1972 UNESCO 
Convention see the accompanying UNESCO Recommendation Concerning the Protection, at 
a National Level, of the Cultural and Natural Heritage (adopted on Nov. 16, 1972), UNESCO 
Doc. 17c/107 (1972), reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1367 (1972) (unilateral actions to 
preserve antiquities are duties owed by the nation in possession of the antiquities to the rest 
of mankind). See Comment, supra note 3, at 54-56. 
For a discussion of the 1970 UNESCO Convention, see Nafziger, Controlling, supra note 
3, at 74; Comment, supra note 5, at 538-41 (background, history and discussion of the Conven-
tion). For a discussion of the drafting and ratification of the final version of the Convention, 
see Rogers & Cohen, infra note 25, at 317; Note, The Legal Response to the Illicit Movement 
of Cultural Property, 5 LAW & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 932 (1973). The 1970 UNESCO Convention 
outlines a series of desirable goals, defines the illicit acts that may affect cultural materials, 
and details the general agreement among signatory nations to enforce the goals and discour-
age the illicit acts. Articles 7-9 of the 1970 UNESCO Convention establish guidelines for the 
enabling legislation of the signatory countries. See Comment, supra note 5, at 549-53. 
Although fashioned as international measures, the Conventions impose upon the individ-
ual subscribing nations the responsiblity for enacting enabling legislation and local compo-
nent plans. The Conventions' effectiveness depends upon their wide acceptance and contin-
ual refinement by the signatory nations. Unfortunately, ratification of the Convention and 
enactment of the necessary legislation has been inadequate. Proceedings, supra note 8, at 98. 
Through January 1, 1976, although 25 countries had ratified or adopted the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention, no major art importing country had enacted the necessary enabling legislation. 
Consequently, the effects of the Convention remain minimal. Id. 
15. Drafts of the necessary implementing legislation for the 1970 Convention have been 
submitted to Congress on three occasions. H.R. 11754 and S. 2677, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); 
H.R. 14171, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); H.R. 5643, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). See Proceed-
ings, supra note 8, at 98 n.5 (H.R. 14171 is reprinted at 135-39); Comment, .-;upra note 3, at 
56. 
According to the most recent version of H.R. 5643, H.R. REP. No. 615, 95th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1977), under specific circumstances, the President will have the power to enter into 
bilateral and multilateral restricted import agreements upon the request of other countries 
for periods of less than 5 years duration to protect jeopardized cultural property. Materials 
imported in contravention of such agreements will be subject to seizure and judicial forfei-
ture. If the importer establishes his status as a bona fide purchaser, without knowledge or 
reason to believe the item was stolen, the importer will be reimbursed his purchase cost unless 
the United States establishes that as a matter of law or reciprocity the claiming state would 
return the article to the United States without requiring payment of compensation. For a 
summary of comments and literature pertaining to one of the enabling bills submitted to 
Congress, see SUBCOMM. ON TRADE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 94TH CONG., 2D 
SESS., WRITTEN COMMENTS ON H.R. 14171 (Comm. print 1976). 
16. Although an international convention of global scope would solve most effectively the 
problem of cultural thefts, the lack of favorable international response to such efforts suggests 
5
Nowell: American Tools
Published by SURFACE, 1978
82 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol.6:77 
United States-Mexico Treaty concerning cultural materials pro-
vides for the recovery and return of limited categories of archaeolog-
ical properties stolen from Mexico. 17 Treaties like the United States-
Mexico Treaty build and test international principles and focus 
efficiently on particular problems or situations unique to the partic-
ular countries. In addition, some governments have taken internal 
that initially a more local approach to the problem will be required. Article 9 of the 1970 
UNESCO Convention expressly encourages bilateral and regional treaties. 1970 UNESCO 
Convention, supra note 13. The most recent version of the United States' enabling legislation 
for the 1970 UNESCO Convention would also allow bilateral agreements in certain circum-
stances. See note 15 supra. 
Each potential solution to the illicit movement problem depends for success on interna-
tional cooperation, national acceptance and secure funding. By pooling cultural and capital 
resources voluntarily and by balancing mutual interests, two or more cooperating nations may 
solve basic problems more easily than would several countries working individually. The 
United States and other capital-rich countries, for example, could play a major role in helping 
art rich countries study and develop awareness of their heritage. In return, the art rich 
countries could allow a steady stream of cultural exhibits to help refine the capital rich 
countries' awareness of international cultural heritage. Comment, supra note 5, at 541 (the 
preamble to the 1970 UNESCO Convention encourages the interchange of cultural materials 
hetween nations). See, e.g., Nafziger, Controlling, supra note 3, at 75. 
The European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage, May 1969, 
Europ. T. S . No. 66, provides an example of a regional treaty that expressly recog-
nizes the seriousness of uncontrolled archaeological excavation and movement of cul-
tural materials. The Convention focuses on controlling excavation and movement of cultural 
materials, encouraging exchange of cultural materials and information bearing on cultural 
materials, and facilitating cooperation in matters relating to cultural materials among signa-
tory members of the Council of Europe. Because the issues dealt with have a limited scope, 
more local significance, and fewer competing national interests, treaties such as the Treaty 
of Cooperation Providing for the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical 
and Cultural Properties, July 17, 1970, United States-Mexico, 22 U.S .T. 494, T.I .A.S. No. 
7088, 791 U.N.T.S . 313 (entered into force March 24, 1971), reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 
1028 (1970) [hereinafter cited as United States-Mexico Treaty), can be implemented rapidly 
with more limited controversy. Hopefully, many agreements with small scopes can be consoli-
dated into a comprehensive treaty fully acceptable to all nations. Bilateral and regional 
alternatives mitigate the jurisdictional difficulties of unilateral provisions such as the NSPA. 
See notes 95 & 111 supra and accompanying texts. 
17. E.g., United States-Mexico Treaty, supra note 16. The treaty is limited to "pre-
Columbian" articles "of outstanding importance to the national patrimony, including stelae 
and architectural features such as relief and wall art . . . that are the property of federal, 
state, or municipal governments or their instrumentalities .. . . "Id., art. I, para. 1. Para-
graph 2 provides some flexibility in the scope of pre-Columbian materials covered by the 
treaty. See Comment, supra note 3, at 58. 
Under this treaty, the United States government represents Mexico as the plaintiff in 
civil actions to recover limited categories of stolen cultural property, thereby saving the 
Mexican government the cost and potential procedural difficulties of litigating in the United 
States. For additional discussion of this treaty and other means of controlling the movements 
of cultural materials, see Nafziger, Controlling, supra note 3, at 73; Comment, New Legal 
Tools to Curb the Illicit Traffic in Pre-C'olumbian Antiquities, 12 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 
316 (1973). 
6
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steps to prevent the removal of their national cultural treasures. 1" 
International cooperation need not be limited to the government 
level; many non-governmental organizations have passed resolu-
tions and taken some steps, such as self-regulation by museums, 
toward controlling the illicit movement of cultural materials. 111 Non-
governmental input provides a healthy complement to national and 
international governmental efforts, because cultural heritage tran-
scends traditional notions of ownership and title. 20 
Despite these international efforts, however, foreign origin ar-
chaeological materials continue to be moved illicitly into the United 
States. Because it appears that the international agreements may 
not achieve their intended effects for some time, the United States, 
as an influential world leader, should first examine the legal tools 
presently available to it to effect a second-best solution within the 
United States, and then decide whether the available tools are in 
net effective enough toward a solution of any part of the destructive 
excavation and movement of foreign origin archaeological materials 
to warrant application. 
Available to the United States are numerous state civil recovery 
18. See B. BURNHAM, THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY (1974) (summarizing, in 
English, the texts of the legislation of over 130 countries governing the discovery, ownership, 
circulation and sale of cultural property). 
19. Such nongovernmental cooperation ranges from international nongovernmental or-
ganizations, such as the International Council of Museums, to national nongovernmental 
organizations, and even includes voluntary private bilateral agreements. Nafziger, !COM, 
supra note 4, lists and describes the goals, efforts and effects that many of the nongovernmen-
tal organizations have had in this effort. Professor Nafziger emphasizes the successes of the 
International Council of Museums, concluding that such international nongovernmental or-
ganizations have a very important present and future role. Id. at 253. Merryman, supra note 
6, at 242, discusses three means which art exporting nations may have of protecting their 
cultural and artistic treasures: hiring local antiquity hunters to work as salaried controlled 
excavators for the state, releasing for sale or trade duplicate specimens from museum stocks, 
and aggressively pursuing its remedies in art importing nations either via existing laws or 
through the exporting nation's lobbying power. Palmer, supra note 3, at 54, discusses four 
legitimate intranational and international means of bringing art and people together: public 
media, exchange of scholars and specialists, commercial transactions, and loan exhibitions. 
Intermuseum agreements, for instance, may ameliorate significantly illegal trafficking by 
having each museum agree not to acquire items of doubtful or illicit provenance. United 
States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 997 n.14 (5th Cir. 1977); Nafziger, Controlling, supra note 
3, at 75. See Hamilton, Museum Acquisitions, The Case for Self-Regulation, in ART LAW: 
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 347 (L. Duboff ed. 1975); Nafziger, Article 7(a) of the UNESCO 
Convention, in ART LAw: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 387 (L. Duboff ed. 1975). 
20. C. McGIMSEY, supra note 11, at 6 ("Legal possession does not automatically carry 
with it the right of destruction, and no individual or corporate body possesses the right 
permanently to deprive the public of any significant part of that heritage."); Nafziger, !COM, 
supra note 4, at 232. 
7
Nowell: American Tools
Published by SURFACE, 1978
84 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol.6:77 
statutes allowing the owner to recover property shown to be stolen. 21 
Also potentially available are civil damages statutes, allowing the 
owner to collect consequential and associated damages resulting 
from the theft. 22 A recent United States customs law relating only 
to pre-Columbian monumental or architectural sculpture mandates 
the seizure and return at the owner's expense of any of these classes 
of property shown to be "stolen."23 
This article will focus on the merits of criminal sanctions, under 
the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA),24 as applied toward the 
control of the movement of foreign origin archaeological materials 
in the United States. Recently, United States authorities have used 
the NSPA in two reported cases to prosecute Americans engaged in 
the transportation in foreign and interstate commerce of illicitly 
removed cultural materials. 25 Prosecution has been based on NSPA 
21. See notes 131-39 infra and accompanying text. 
22. See notes 155-61 infra and accompanying text. 
23. See note 92 infra. 
24. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2311-2318 (1976) . Throughout this article reference to the National 
Stolen Property Act (NSPA) corresponds only to §§ 2314 and 2315. 
Section 2314 provides: 
Whoever transports in interstate or foreign commerce any goods, wares, merchandise, 
securities or money, of the value of $5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been 
stolen, converted, or taken by fraud ... shall be fined not more than $10,000 or 
imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. 
18 u.s.c. § 2314 (1976). 
Section 2315 provides: 
Whoever receives, conceals, stores, barters, sells or disposes of any goods, wares, or 
merchandise, securities, or money of the value of$5,000 or more, or pledges or accepts 
as security for a loan of any goods, wares, or merchandise, or securities, of the value 
of $500 or more, moving as, or which are a part of, or which constitute interstate or 
foreign commerce, knowing the same to have been stolen, unlawfully converted, or 
taken . .. shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten 
years, or both. 
18 U.S.C. § 2315 (1976). 
The other sections of the Act refer to general definitions(§ 2311), stolen vehicles(§§ 2312-
2313), stolen cattle (§§ 2316-2317), and phonograph records bearing forged or counterfeit 
la he ls ( § 2318). 
Until 1973, the NSPA was applied in only two reported cases involving foreign situs theft, 
neither of which involved foreign situs archaeological theft or illicit movement of stolen 
artifacts. United States v. Rabin, 316 F.2d 564 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 815 (1963); 
United States v. Greco, 298 F.2d 247 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 820 (1962). 
25. Several American citizens have been convicted under the NSPA in three recent 
archaeological theft cases. See United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977); United 
States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Brown, (D. Ark. 1973) 
(unreported). McClain and Hollinshead are discussed in the text. In United States v. Brown, 
a federal grand jury in Arkansas indicted Harry K. Brown in May, 1973, on charges of 
conspiring to transport a stolen artifact in interstate commerce. The FBI found and im-
pounded a Mayan stele originating in Guatemala in Brown's home. The indictment alleged 
that Brown had shipped the stele to Key West, Florida and offered to sell it to the Denver 
Art Museum. Brown pleaded guilty, was fined $2,500 and was placed on probation for three 
years. The stele was turned over to the Guatemala government. The case is described in K. 
8
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 6, No. 1 [1978], Art. 4
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol6/iss1/4
1978] American Tools 85 
provisions that prohibit the transportation,211 sale, or receipt27 of 
goods known to be stolen. 
In the first case, United States u. Hollinshead, 211 a federal grand 
jury indicted Clive Hollinshead, an art "dealer," for transporting 
and conspiring to transport stolen property in interstate commerce. 
Hollinshead allegedly had traveled to British Honduras, negotiated 
with several persons for the purchase of a well-studied Mayan stele, 
returned to the United States and took possession of the stele which 
had been cut into pieces and smuggled out of Guatemala via British 
Honduras. 29 Although Hollinshead argued that he thought the stele 
had come legally from British Honduras, 311 the stele clearly had been 
removed recently from Guatemala in violation of a Guatemalan law 
that prohibited export of nationally owned archaeological materials 
without government approval. Several government witnesses testi-
fied that Hollinshead had characterized the stele as smuggled from 
Guatemala. 31 Hollinshead was convicted by the district court and 
fined $5,000 for conspiring to move, and actually moving the stele 
in United States interstate commerce.32 
In the second case, United States u. McClain,:1:1 a district court 
convicted and sentenced five people to two 3-year terms of imprison-
ment each for receiving and selling "stolen" non-monumental pre-
Columbian antiquities originating in Mexico, and conspiring to 
transport this "stolen" property in foreign and interstate commerce. 
On appeal, the decision was reversed and the case remanded for a 
retrial. 34 The defendants allegedly admitted that several groups 
were acquiring pre-Columbian artifacts in Mexico and shipping 
them to the defendants in the United States. Government witnesses 
MEYER, supra note 3, at 33; Rogers & Cohen, Art Pillage-International Solutions, in ART 
LAw: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 315, 321 (L. Duboff ed. 1975); Comment, supra note 3, at 
59. 
26. 18 u.s.c. § 2314 (1976). 
27. 18 u.s.c. § 2315 (1976). 
28. 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974), discussed in Note, United States v. Hollin.~head: A 
New Leap in Extraterritorial Application of Criminal l~aws, HASTINGS INT1L & COMP. L. REV., 
Spring 1977, at 149 (Inaugural Issue). 
29. 495 F.2d at 1155. 
30. Brief for Appellant at 15-17, United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 
1974). 
31. Brief for Appellee at 29-31, United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 
1974). 
32. Id. at 4. Hollinshead was not convicted for the theft of the stele. The court of appeals 
affirmed. 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974). 
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described the defendants' characterization of the artifacts as 
"stolen" or "smuggled."35 Although it was reasonably clear that the 
artifacts had been illegally exported,:18 the court of appeals held that 
the government had not proved that the Mexican government 
owned the property, and that such a determination was necessary 
before the property could be considered "stolen" under the NSPA.:1; 
The appellants argued in part that the lower court misapplied a 
series of five Mexican statutes that altered the legal capacity of 
private individuals to own archaeological materials.:i" Only the lat-
est law declares that the Republic of Mexico owns all pre-
Columbian artifacts. 311 The court ruled that the dates of initial pri-
vate ownership and initial export from Mexico were critical in deter-
mining the Mexican Government's rights to the artifacts under the 
applicable law. Since the prosecutor did not enter these dates into 
evidence, the applicable Mexican law could not be ascertained and 
the case was remanded for retrial on this issue. 40 
In addition to the NSPA, state penal statutes prohibiting the 
receiving of stolen property41 may be helpful in combating the illicit 
movement of foreign cultural materials.42 However, no reported for-
eign situs archaeological theft or illicit movement of archaeological 
material cases have been brought under a state statute. 
While use of the NSPA presents a new approach to the problem 
of illicit movement of cultural materials, its application is limited 
35. Brief for Appellee at 4-7, United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977). 
36. 545 F.2d at 993. 
37. Id. at 1003. 
38. Id. at 997-1003. The five Mexican statutes were dated 1897, 1930, 1934, 1970 and 
1972. 
39. Federal law on Archaeological, Artistic and Historic Monuments and Zones, Articles 
16, & 27-29, 312 D.O. 16 (Mexico 1972). 
40. 545 F.2d at 1003. 
41. Receiving stolen property is outlawed in every state. Blakey & Goldsmith, Criminal 
Redistribution of Stolen Property: The Need for /Jaw Reform, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1512, 1543 
n.185 (1976). State legislation is comprehensively analyzed in THE NATIONAL AssocIATION OF 
ATTORNEYS GENERAL, COMM'N ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO 
DEALING IN STOLEN Goons 33-37 (Dec. 1975). 
42. State penal statutes would be subject to the same arguments made in this article. 
However, these statutes are made even less attractive as a result of their lack of uniformity 
with respect to their content and resulting penalties. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE§§ 27, 496-
497, 778a, 789 (West 1977); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 165.40, 165.45, 165.50, 165.55, 165.60, and 
165.65 (McKinney 1975). California has some interesting statutes supporting jurisdiction over 
extraterritorial crimes provided there is some minimal contact with California. See CAL. 
PENAL CODE §§ 27, 788a & 789 (West 1977). For a discussion of these statutes, see Schwab, 
Have Crime, Will Travel, 50 CAL. ST. B.J. 30 (1975). State and local laws generally provide 
for the seizure of stolen property without requiring knowledge on the part of the possessor 
that the ohject is stolen. Comment, supra note 3, at 59. 
10
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to cases involving easily proved thefts. This article assesses the 
applicability and effectiveness of the NSPA in cases of illicit move-
ment in the United States of cultural materials "stolen" from their 
foreign situs origins. The article focuses on "archaeological theft," 
most clearly illustrated in the case of persons taking nationally 
owned archaeological materials without permission, usually from 
their original situs in a state preserve, as opposed to "simple theft" 
or "illegal export. " 43 Simple theft is a matter of a person taking 
property from a private owner. 44 Illegal export is a statutory crime 
usually independent of theft. 45 No United States criminal statute 
specifically prohibits the importation of illegally exported cultural 
materials. 46 Archaeological theft and simple theft should not be con-
fused with illegally exported cultural materials. The NSPA reaches 
only "stolen" property. It does not apply to cultural materials ille-
gally exported but not stolen. 47 Unless the state retains property 
rights or interests in the material illegally exported, no theft occurs 
under American standards by the mere removal; the case is simply 
one of "illegal exportation" with no "stolen property" involved.·•11 
43. SeeJ. MERRYMAN & A. Ei..SEN, LAW, ETHICS AND THE V1suALARTS 141 (temp. ed. 1975). 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. See United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 996 (5th Cir. 1977). 
47. Id. at 1000-01. 
48. Id. at 997-1004. The McClain court held that although the materials involved were 
illegally exported, they were not necessarily stolen. The question was whether the applicable 
Mexican law actually declared government ownership of the artifacts, or only restricted their 
export. If the latter interpretation applied, the case would be one not of archaeological theft, 
but rather merely of illegal export and the NSPA would not be applicable. "IRJestrictions 
on exportation are just like any other police power restrictions. They do not create ownership 
in the state." Id. at 1002. 
The case of the "Boston Raphael" provides a good example of illegal exportation without 
theft. Italian law prohibited the export of privately owned works of art that were classified 
as "national'treasures." An Italian sold a painting so classified to an American who allegedly 
smuggled it out of Italy and into the United States. J. MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN, supra note 43, 
at 141, 151-62. The 1970 UNESCO Convention does not reach cultural materials that have 
not been stolen. The Convention applies only to cultural materials exported contrary to the 
laws of the country of origin. 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 13, art. 7(a); Nafziger, 
!COM, supra note 4, at 238. · 
Some governments allow private domestic ownership of any antiquities but prohibit their 
export, other states limit or prohibit exports and in addition retain all property rights in the 
antiquities. For a list of countries and their various claims of ownership of cultural materials, 
see B. BURNHAM, supra note 18; K. MEYER, supra note 2. For instance, the Turkish Govern-
ment owns, by law, all antiquities in that country and prohibits their export without a license. 
B. BURNHAM, supra at 146. The Mexican National Cultural Patrimony Act of 1970 was a less 
restrictive statute that allowed private ownership of cultural materials but prohibited their 
export without express governmental permission. 545 F.2d at 999. The current 1972 law makes 
all archaeological materials the inalienable property of the government. Federal Law on 
11
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Part II analyzes the difficulties in applying the NSPA to ar-
chaeological material stolen at a foreign situs, pointing to the addi-
tional difficulties in interpreting and enforcing a statute not drafted 
to deal with this specific problem. It is argued that the inherent 
limitations of the NSPA with respect to the illicit movement of 
archaeological materials prevent it from being a significant tool for 
controlling the movement of cultural materials. This discussion 
stresses the difficulties in recognizing unstudied archaeological ma-
terials as missing from their origins and if located, identified as 
"stolen." The scienter requirement further reduces the chances of 
conviction. Part III notes that while no American effort alone can 
control the illicit movement of archaeological materials, the pres-
ently available civil remedies under federal and state statutes of 
damages and recovery of stolen property are broader reaching, po-
tentially more effective and efficient American tools to help control 
the illicit movement of archaeological materials in the United 
States. 
II. DIFFICULTIES IN APPLYING THE NSPA TO THE 
ILLICIT MOVEMENT OF FOREIGN ORIGIN 
ARCHAEOLOGICAL MATERIALS IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. Statutory Interpretation Problems 
Illicit movement of archaeological materials easily falls within 
NSPA prohibitions. 49 Provided the defendant knows the property to 
have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud, mere transportation50 
of "stolen" property51 to the United States, or the receipt, conceal-
Archaeological, Artistic, and Historic Monuments and Zones, art. 27, 312 D.O. 16 (Mexico 
1972). For a discussion of the 1972 Law, see Nafziger, Controlling, supra note 3, at 71. 
The United States has limited statutes that protect American antiquities located on 
lands owned or controlled by the government. The statutes do not, however, prohibit the 
exportation or importation of antiquities. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (1976); C. McGIMSEY, supra 
note 11. There have been no reported applications of the NSPA to archaeological thefts within 
the United States. 
49. United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 994 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Hollins-
head, 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974). 
50. 18 u.s.c. § 2314 (1976). 
51. Id. §§ 2314-2315. The term "stolen" has no common law derivative and usually is 
construed broadly by American courts. United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 417 (1957) 
("stolen" includes all felonious takings and is not limited to common law larceny); 545 F.2d 
at 995. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 532 F.2d 1218, 1227 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 
U.S. 839 (1976) ("'stolen' means acquired or possessed, as a result of some wrongful or dis-
honest act or taking whereby a person wilfully obtains or retains possession of property 
which belongs to another, without or beyond any permission given, and with the intent to 
deprive the owner of the benefit of ownership"); Lyda v. United States, 279 F.2d 461 (5th 
12
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ment, storage, barter or sale52 while the property is in interstate or 
foreign commerce, violates the statute.5:1 Despite the apparent ease 
with which the statute may seem to apply to foreign origin archaeo-
logical materials, the NSPA was drafted to deal with a very different 
problem, namely, theft of standard, modern commercial goods 
clearly "owned" and "possessed" by some person or corporation 
before their theft. 54 
When a court applies the NSPA to property stolen within the 
United States, it must establish and define the elements of trans-
portation, bartering or selling, "stolen" property, and scienter.a!i Al-
though a foreign situs archaeological theft has several elements in 
common with such cases, determining the operative definition of 
"stolen" and proving the defendant's knowledge that the property 
was stolen presents unusual difficulties.a11 Because the NSPA was 
not drafted with foreign archaeological thefts in mind, its legislative 
history provides little help in interpreting the statute. The potential 
conflict between a broad interpretation of the NSPA by the courts 
and United States foreign policy efforts at solving the worldwide 
problem of illicit movement of archaeological materials presents a 
final consideration in applying the NSPA to movements of foreign 
origin archaeological materials in the United States. 
1. THE NSP A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: A PooR INTERPRETATIONAL Am 
Congress intended the NSP A to reach organized criminals who 
steal property in one state of the United States and sell it to persons 
in different states.57 Congress also intended the NSPA to reach 
Cir. 1960) (section 2314 reaches all ways by which owners are wrongfully deprived of the use 
or benefit of their property). 
52. 18 u.s.c. § 2315 (1976). 
53. In addition, the aggregate value of the stolen property must exceed $5000 to bring 
charges under the NSPA. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315 (1976). Value, the price a willing buyer 
would pay a willing seller, may be determined at any time during the receipt or concealment 
of the stolen property. 545 F.2d at 1004. 
54. See text accompanying notes 57-58 infra. 
55. See, e.g., Pearson v. United States, 378 F.2d 555, 560 (5th Cir. 1967); United States 
v. Tannuzzo, 174 F.2d 177, 180 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 815 (1949). 
56. See text accompanying notes 65-89 & 108-112 infra. 
57. United States v. Sheridan, 329 U.S. 379 (1946); United States v. Patten, 345 F. Supp. 
967 (D.P.R. 1972); Cooper v. North Jersey Trust Co., 226 F. Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); 
H.R. REP. No. 1599, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934); 78 CONG. REC. 6981 (1934) (characterizing 
the NSPA legislation as anti-gangster and anti-racketeer). See Note, supra note 28, at 170. 
Congress' purpose in passing the NSPA was to discourage both the receiving of stolen goods 
and their initial taking. 545 F.2d at 994. It was originally drafted as an extension of the 
provisions of the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act of 1919, 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1976) 
13
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thefts of material moving in interstate or foreign commerce.ax The 
recorded legislative history of the NSPA and its various amend-
ments do not mention foreign situs thefts.a11 Congress simply never 
contemplated including or excluding foreign situs thefts, archaeo-
logical or otherwise, within the scope of the NSPA. 60 
Courts often look to legislative intent in the face of a statute's 
(NMVTA). For a brief review of the legislative history and purpose of the NMVTA, see 
United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 413-17 (1957); Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 1309 (1957). 
The NSPA has been used in some foreign commerce cases. In two cases, courts convicted 
defendants under the NSPA of receiving and/or transporting in interstate and foreign com-
merce Canadian bonds that they knew to have been stolen in Canada. United States v. Rabin, 
316 F.2d 564 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 815 (1963); United States v. Greco, 298 F.2d 
247 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 820 (1962). In each case the court had to decide whether 
the NSPA applied to bonds stolen beyond the territorial limits of the United States. Both 
courts held that the NSPA applied whenever the courts determined that the materials were 
stolen in another country. 316 F.2d at 566; 298 F.2d at 251. As the McClain court explained, 
"The Republic of Mexico, when stolen property has moved across the Mexican border, is in 
a similar position to any state of the United States in which a theft occurs and the property 
is moved across state boundaries." 545 F.2d at 994. Contra, Note, supra note 28. 
58. H.R. REP. No. 1599, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934); 78 CONG. REC. 8777-78 (1934). 
59. Note, supra note 28, at 170. One express exception was an amendment to extend the 
NSPA to any property seized in violation of law or confiscated by a foreign government. For 
the clearest discussion of the amendment, see Extending the National Stolen Property Act 
to Confiscated Property: Hearings on H.R. 9669 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the Comm. on 
the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 77 Cong., 3d Sess. (1940); 86 CONG. REc. 12971-
98 (1940). The debate on the amendment focused on American owned commercial property 
and raw materials that a foreign government confiscated and then tried to sell in the United 
States. The amendment did not pass. 
60. Note, supra note 28, at 170. Foreign situs archaeological thefts generally are thefts 
of foreign situs items that may then be put into United States foreign commerce. One case 
has held that Congress intended the NSPA to apply to acts committed in a foreign country 
intended to have an injurious effect on United States foreign commerce. United States v. 
Braverman, 376 F.2d 249, 251 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 885 (1967). In Braverman, the 
court held that the cashing of counterfeit money orders drawn on an American bank in a 
foreign country constituted transportation of stolen property in United States foreign com-
merce. The United States was directly and clearly injuriously affected in a manner predeter-
mined at the time of the extraterritorial act of cashing the money orders. Braverman knew 
when he cashed the counterfeit money orders in Brazil that he was putting them into United 
States foreign commerce because they ultimately had to be paid in New York by the bank 
against which they were drawn. Id. The only possible value of the stolen goods derived from 
their potential entrance into United States foreign commerce. 
In the foreign situs archaeological theft cases, however, no clearly injurious and predeter-
mined effect on United States foreign commerce analogous to cashing the counterfeit money 
orders takes place at the time of any alleged "theft." The value of the particular goods may 
be captured independent of their future entry into United States foreign commerce. The 
Braverman decision is therefore too limited to support the general application of the NSPA 
to foreign situs archaeological theft cases insofar as it requires a direct or proximate injury 
on United States foreign commerce. The Braverman rationale can support applying the 
NSPA to thefts perpetrated with the intent to enter the cultural materials into United States 
foreign commerce. Proof of such intent may be impossible however. 
14
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ambiguity. 81 Alternatively, even when the facts clearly fit within the 
letter of a statute, a court may refuse to appiy the statute because 
to do so would not be "within its spirit, nor within the intention of 
its makers. " 82 Because Congress never specifically considered the 
application of the NSPA to foreign situs archaeological thefts, n:i leg-
islative intent is unclear and neither of these two court practices can 
be of substantial application. 
Statutes are often applied to situations not specifically contem-
plated by their framers. However, enforcement difficulties are en-
countered and policy considerations are raised in applying the 
NSPA to movement of foreign origin archaeological materials in the 
United States which are absent in usual NSPA cases. For instance, 
application of the NSPA to movement of foreign origin archaeologi-
cal materials raises considerations of national versus international 
interests in the distribution and degree of freedom of movement of 
art. 84 Because the NSPA legislative history and policy provides an 
inadequate rationale for its application to such movements, its ap-
plications should be evaluated and alternative solutions should be 
considered. 
2. DETERMINING WHETHER CULTURAL Goons ARE "STOLEN" WITHIN 
THE MEANING OF THE NSP A 
Determining whether property has been stolen so that the 
NSPA may be applied85 presents a difficult task in the context of 
movement of foreign origin archaeological materials within the 
United States.88 Nations have ownership and theft laws that often 
differ from United States' statutes.67 Courts attempting to choose 
and apply the myriad possible laws could face a very difficult task. 
At least one author has characterized the application of the NSPA 
to foreign situs thefts as improper since the property has not been 
stolen within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. sK This 
61. E.g., 545 F .2d at 996. 
62. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892). 
63. See note 59 supra and accompanying text. 
64. See Bator, Regulation and Deregulation of International Trade in ART LAw: DOMES-
TIC AND INTERNATIONAL 299 (L. Duboff ed. 1975); Merryman, supra note 6, at 233. 
65. For a discussion of the "stolen" requirement, see Blakey & Goldsmith, supra note 
41, at 1551. 
66. See notes 65-89 and accompanying text. 
67. See note 18 supra. For instance, many countries (e.g., Afghanistan, Honduras, Peru 
and Thailand) assert national "ownership" or "protection" of all cultural materials, but 
recognize the right of private ownership of them. 
68. Note, supra note 28. 
15
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view ignores other ways of characterizing the application of the 
NSPA, such as that by the McClain court. McClain 611 has simplified 
these difficulties by holding that courts should apply the broad 
American definition of theft70 and use foreign local ownership laws 
to determine whether foreign origin archaeological materials have 
been "stolen. " 71 
a. Use of Foreign Ownership Laws 
The McClain court's decision to use foreign ownership laws to 
apply the NSPA furthers the protection of the owner's recognized 
property rights worldwide.72 However, the foreign nation either must 
recognize private ownership of the archaeological material in ques-
tion or claim national ownership before the material may qualify as 
stolen under the NSPA.73 McClain holds that when local foreign 
laws do not recognize government or private ownership of archaeo-
logical cultural materials, 74 uncontrolled excavation or exportation 
of cultural materials from such countries does not violate the NSPA 
because the materials are not stolen from an "owner."75 The 
McClain decision seeks to assure that persons will not be convicted 
under the NSPA when the removal of archaeological materials does 
not violate foreign penal codes. Such was the reason for remanding 
United States v. McClain, to determine whether the defendants had 
by their actions violated a Mexican statute.76 
69. 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977). For a discussion of McClain, see text accompanying 
notes 33-40 supra. 
70. See note 51 supra. 
71. 545 F.2d at 1001-02. The McClain court rejected the argument that reference to 
foreign standards of ownership in the application of the NSPA to foreign thefts makes the 
Act void for vagueness since the "scienter requirement eliminates the possibility that a 
defendant is convicted for an offense he could not have understood to exist." Id. at 1002 n.30. 
What really is at issue here, is the application of the NSPA to the results of a foreign theft. 
72. Id. at 996. Although the McClain court asserted that legislators intended the NSPA 
to protect owners of property worldwide, the court did not support its assertion. No legislative 
materials dealing with the NSPA mention foreign situs thefts. See note 59 supra. 
Requiring the court to look beyond the familiar American statutes increases the burden 
on the court. Prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel should be able to apprise the court 
of the applicable foreign statutes, however. 
73. 545 F.2d at 1000-01. A simple declaration of ownership is adequate. However, the 
McClain court carefully noted that the NSPA would not apply to property regulated, but not 
owned, by the government. 545 F.2d at 1002. The McClain court also held that possession of 
the material was not a necessary element of "ownership." 545 F.2d at 992. 
74. See B. BURNHAM, supra note 18; K. MEYER, supra note 2, at 240-53. Note that many 
foreign statutes dealing with national ownership of cultural materials were not enacted until 
well into the 20th century. Consequently, a vast number of culturally important artifacts have 
been legally moved and exported, and are presently in museums and private collections. 
75. 545 F.2d at 1001-02. 
76. Id. at 1003. 
16
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 6, No. 1 [1978], Art. 4
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol6/iss1/4
1978] American Tools 93 
When relying on foreign ownership laws to support NSPA pros-
ecutions, determining the date of removal is of paramount import-
ance. Changes in foreign ownership laws in recent years have cre-
ated special problems in interpreting and applying foreign laws. 
First, the applicable foreign ownership laws must be identified. 77 
Because the date of removal is often uncertain, such identification 
may prove troublesome. The McClain case was remanded to deter-
mine when the artifacts were removed and, when removed, which 
of the five successive Mexican antiquities laws governed. 78 Even 
when the correct foreign law has been isolated, it may be broader 
or narrower than American ownership statutes. 711 Problems in trans-
lating foreign statutes and international cultural connotative and 
denotative differences increase the difficulty in interpreting foreign 
laws that vest ownership of cultural materials.80 
Applying foreign ownership laws causes one final difficulty. The 
McClain court's holding requires only violation of private or na-
tional ownership rights for the NSPA to be applicable.81 The trans-
77. See, e.g., id. 
78. Id. at 1000. 
79. Incongruity between American and foreign descriptions of ownership is likely to 
cause confusion, exacerbated by changes of foreign laws. 
For an example of the uncertainty arising from the recognition of a foreign state's laws, 
see the discussion in McClain of the various interpretations of the often revised Mexican 
Antiquities Statute. 545 F.2d at 997-1000. 
The 1972 Mexican .Antiquities Statute, for example, recognizes the private right to pos-
sess and to transfer cultural materials, but excludes the right to export them. 312 D. 0. 16 
(Mexico 1972). At the same time, the satute establishes national ownership of all archaeologi-
cal materials. 545 F.2d at 1000. Other countries claim less comprehensive government owner-
ship of cultural materials. B. BURNHAM, supra note 18. The American Antiquities Act of 1906 
declares antiquities on lands owned or controlled by the government of the United States to 
be government property. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (1976). The Act does not provide for a separa-
tion of ownership and possession interests in cultural materials. 
80. Macrory, supra note 9, at 21; see, e.g., 545 F.2d at 1000. In McClain, conflicting 
translations of various Mexican statutes formed a critical element of appeal. The court noted 
that the potential culture-supplied connotations of the laws are discernible and understanda-
ble only after a careful study of the entire culture and are potentially misleading after a 
partial reading of the statute out of context. The various words that can be translated into 
"ownership" provide-a specific example. See B. BURNHAM, supra note 18, at 29, 88 (in Afghan-
istan, property is under the "protection and surveillance of the state"; in Hungary, all out-
standingly important items are museum pieces, whether in public or private possession, and 
are protected by the state with rights of usage and conservation reserved by the state). 
Recognizing these foreign law interpretational difficulties, the McClain court noted that, 
in general, penal laws should be construed strictly, 545 F.2d at 995 (citing United States v. 
Boston & M.R. Co., 380 U.S. 157, 160 (1965)), and that "ambiguity concerning the ambit of 
criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity." 545 F.2d at 995 (quoting Rewis v. 
United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971)). Uncertainty in the application of foreign statutes also 
bears upon proving scienter, an element of the NSPA discussed below. See notes 108-18 infra 
and accompanying text. 
81. 545 F.2d at 1001. 
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actional setting of NSPA prosecutions is the prosecution of a traf-
ficker in stolen goods in the United States. However, when the 
NSPA is applied to foreign situs archaeological thefts from nations 
which allow private ownership, but prohibit export of archaeological 
materials, the action closely resembles United States enforcement 
of a foreign law prohibiting export,82 counter to the expressed Ameri-
can policy against enforcement of foreign penal laws. 11 :1 As the 
McClain court properly notes, however, any apparent "enforcement 
of foreign laws" occurs only as a by-product of the prosecution of 
violations of the NSPA. 84 Prosecution under the NSPA can be dis-
tinguished from simple enforcement of the foreign law. Whether an 
item is owned by a foreign nation and exported in violation of for-
eign laws, and whether the defendant knew it was "stolen," are two 
separate questions involving different evidentiary issues. Both ques-
tions must be satisfactorily answered for conviction under the 
NSPA. The McClain court relied on the specific requirement of 
scienter to avoid unjust convictions under the NSPA as interpreted 
to use foreign ownership laws and the broad American definition of 
theft. 85 
82. Id. at 1002; Macrory, supra note 9, at 21. Actually the McClain court could have 
interpreted the NSPA to establish a more limited duty to protect foreign governments . The 
court stated that governments had done as much as was reasonably possible by declaring 
ownership of all cultural materials and prohibiting their exportation. 545 F.2d at 1001. How-
ever, the court might have required governments to unite possession and ownership, or to at 
least manifest prior possession or perfected interest. Under the McClain interpretation, the 
NSPA applies to property a foreign government has never physically possessed, identified, 
catalogued, known about or for which it has never otherwise specifically accounted. The 
alternate interpretation, while providing more certain identification and thus facilitating 
recovery of stolen property, would not protect the majority of foreign situs archaeological 
property which remains unstudied. See notes 99-107 infra and accompanying text. 
83. The United States has a long-standing policy of not executing the penal laws of 
another country. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 393 n.10 (1946); The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 
Wheaton) 66 (1825); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICTS OF LAW § 89 (1971) (no action will be 
entertained on a foreign penal cause of action); Leflar, Conflict of Laws: Choice of Law in 
Criminal Cases, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 44, 46 (1974); Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of 
Penal and Governmental Claims, 46 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1932); Note, supra note 28. For a 
discussion of this policy in the context of foreign situs archaeological theft, see Proceedings, 
supra note 8, at 112 ("American courts are reluctant to defer to the laws of another nation 
where they prejudice the rights of the United States or the rights of its citizens, Emory v. 
Greenough, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 369 (1797), or where the law contravenes an established policy 
(such as encouraging importation of ancient artifacts), Loughian [sicl v. Loughian f sicl, 
292 U.S. 216 (1933)."). 
84. 545 F.2d at 996. To the extent the defendant does not know the foreign law, a court 
will not enforce the foreign law at all. Scienter is discussed at notes 108-18 infra and accompa-
nying text. 
18
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 6, No. 1 [1978], Art. 4
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol6/iss1/4
1978] American Tools 95 
b. Application of the American Definition of Theft 
The McClain court's decision to apply the American definition 
of theft86 to cases of foreign situs removal of archaeological materials 
supports the intent of the NSPA to protect owners of property. 87 The 
American definition of the term "stolen" has been interpreted to 
mean "acquired or possessed, as a result of some wrongful or dishon-
est act or taking whereby a person wilfully obtains or retains posses-
sion of property which belongs to another, without or beyond any 
permission given, and with the intent to deprive the owner of the 
benefit of ownership."88 The American definition of theft, tempered 
by the requirements of ownership and scienter adequately protects 
persons rightfully possessing property against unjust application of 
the NSPA. 89 Use of the American definition of theft rather than 
diverse foreign definitions also allows the scienter requirement to be 
applied more uniformly and proved more easily. 1111 
3. NSPA APPLICATION TO MOVEMENT OF ARCHAEOLOGICAL 
MATERIALS: LIMITING THE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATING POSITION? 
Applying the NSPA broadly under the McClain interpretation 
to foreign situs archaeological thefts conflicts with present ap-
proaches and may conflict with future approaches by the United 
States toward an international solution. 91 Broad application limits 
85. 545 F.2d at 1001 n.30. 
86. See note 51 supra and text accompanying note 70 supra. 
87 . See note 72 supra and accompanying text. In addition, the single American definition 
of "stolen" can be interpreted and applied more easily than the various foreign statutes or 
concepts of "stolen." See notes 77-79 supra and accompanying text. 
88. United States v. Anderson, 532 F.2d 1218, 1227 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 839 
(1976). See note 51 supra. 
89. 545 F.2d at 1002 n.30. In any case, the NSPA cannot reach non-prohibited, unsuper-
vised excavation in countries in which the local government "owns" archaeological materials 
but nonetheless consents to private possession and movement of the material. Such consent 
negates any notion of theft by excavation under the American definition of theft. 
90. See note 87 supra. 
91. In negotiating the 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 13, one of the basic United 
States principles was that the United States was "not prepared to give the rest of the world 
a blank check in that [the United States] would not automatically enforce, through import 
controls, whatever export controls were established by the other country" except within the 
narrow limits of Article 9. Proceedings, supra note 8, at 114. See note 14 supra. The current 
United States diplomatic position is that the United States "should cooperate with foreign 
countries to put some limitation on the illicit traffic in cultural property, and that [the 
United States] should actively seek to encourage these countries to liberalize their legislation 
where it unduly restricts the international circulation of cultural property." Proceedings, 
supra note 8, at 113. On this issue, see Bator, supra note 64, at 305 (American or international 
adoption of a blank check rule barring the import of anything that has been exported illegally 
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the negotiating position of the State Department in establishing, by 
international agreement, the details of protection of cultural materi-
als. For instance, NSPA application differs in scope from the cus-
toms regulations92 and international instruments concerning the 
protection of cultural materials to which the United States is a 
party.93 Each instrument narrowly defines the categories of antiqui-
ties covered and specifies the limited legal sanctions the United 
States will bring to bear. By contrast, the NSPA applies a poten-
tially far more powerful sanction to all categories of cultural materi-
als and, as interpreted in McClain, encourages blanket foreign own-
ership laws.94 Unfortunately, blanket foreign ownership laws and 
export bans together often lead to the creation of black markets for 
cultural materials.95 
The theft and removal of cultural materials from their country 
of origin is an international problem. The NSPA, however, is a 
national statute, with prosecution dependent upon Justice Depart-
ment interpretation. To the extent that NSPA prosec'utions inter-
fere with or retard efforts at a more comprehensive solution to the 
entire movement of foreign origin archaeological materials problem, 
prosecution should be reconsidered. 
B. NSPA Enforcement Difficulties 
The NSPA must be enforced effectively in order to deter the 
inflow and movement of stolen archaeological materials within the 
United States and thereby contribute toward the ultimate deter-
would be substantially undesirable and an administrative nightmare so long as some art 
exporting countries are thinking in terms of an embargo of cultural materials). 
92. United States Customs Law, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2091-2095 (1976), regulates the importa-
tion of pre-Columbian monumental or architectural sculpture or murals. This statute, the 
1970 UNESCO Convention, and the United States-Mexico Treaty all have provisions regard-
ing cultural property defined by the instrument and foreign statutes as stolen. Instead of 
criminal provisions, in each case return of the property is called for. 
93. E.g., United States-Mexico Treaty, supra note 16; 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra 
note 13. The State Department does not favor criminal penalties for the importation of 
illegally exported cultural materials. The Department does favor seizures and forfeitures of 
specific materials listed by the Secretary of the Treasury or specifically included in agree-
ments between the United States and other State Party signatories to the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention. See Proceedings, supra note 8. 
94. See Macrory, supra note 9, at 23. Several countries have already brought their anti-
quities under the protection of the NSPA by declaring ownership of all cultural materials. 
They have also prohibited exportation of the materials without government permission. Ex-
amples of such nations include Algeria, Egypt, Greece, Honduras, and Turkey. Id. at 23 n.7. 
95. Bator, supra note 64, at 304; Nafziger, Controlling, supra note 3, at 71. Such extreme 
foreign laws limiting the dispersion of cultural materials may not be in the United States' 
overall interest. Bator, supra at 304. See note 64 supra. 
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rence of the destructive initial movement of cultural materials. The 
NSPA's deterrent effect, however, diminishes in direct relation to 
its enforcement difficulties and the improbability that the NSPA 
will reach all the parties to the illicit movement of the cultural 
materials. 96 Enforcement problems begin with inadequate study of 
archaeological materials to facilitate ·recognition of stolen materials 
and proof of scienter.97 NSPA application may also have a counter-
productive effect on the highly visible members of society who han-
dle the bulk of cultural materials. Antiquity dealers, scholars, and 
museum staff members, upon whose expert knowledge, services, 
and cooperation successful enforcement of the NSPA may depend, 
can be unnecessarily alienated by overly aggressive enforcement of 
these criminal provisions.98 The enforcement difficulties accompa-
nying NSPA application to movement of foreign origin archaeologi-
cal materials ·in the United States accentuate the need for alterna-
tive solutions. 
1. THE UNSTUDIED NATURE OF ARCHAEOLOGICAL MATERIALS HAMPERS 
THEIR RECOGNITION AS STOLEN 
As discussed above, applying the NSPA to the movement of 
foreign origin archaeological materials requires an initial determina-
tion of which country's ownership statutes pertain and whether any 
property has been "stolen."99 To answer the first question, a court 
must be able to determine the country of origin and date of initial 
private ownership or export of the cultural materials. In United 
States v. Hollinshead, a crucial question in determining theft was 
whether the more stringent Guatemalan ownership law applied or 
whether the object originated in British Honduras and may not have 
96. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 287 (1968). 
97. Also, the NSPA can reach only persons with minimal jurisdictional contacts with the 
United States. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S . 310 (1945). S ee The 
Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S . (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) ("The jurisdiction of 
the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute . It is susceptible to 
no limitation not imposed by itself.") . 
98. These antiquity dealers, scholars, and museum staff members are easily reached by 
civil suits for the return of the stolen materials since they are usually easy to locate and 
continued employment is substantially dependent on reasonable cooperation with law en-
forcement officials. See notes 131-45 infra and accompanying text; Comment, supra note 3, 
at 65. Increasing the burden on these persons in their efforts to ensure that they are not even 
appearing to be associated with stolen goods, by an aggressive enforcement of the NSPA with 
its broad definition of stolen goods, may discourage these persons from undertaking many of 
the services they presently undertake . 
99. United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 1003 (5th Cir. 1977) . See notes 65-90 supra 
and accompanying text. 
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been "stolen."100 In United States v. McClain, the dates of initial 
ownership and export were critical in determining which of the five 
different Mexican antiquities laws governed. 101 
Unfortunately, the academic community has catalogued or 
studied only a small percentage of the monuments and archaeologi-
cal sites known to exist in the world. 102 As a result, the provenance 
and date of export of particular objects often cannot be pinpointed 
once they have been removed from their natural settings. Addition-
ally, many cultures spanned land areas that now encompass several 
modern states, making it impossible to identify certain materials as 
having originated in a particular country and thus "owned" under 
that country's law .103 Finally, since many countries only recently 
have passed legislation addressing the issues of theft and the na-
tional ownership of cultural materials, 104 an unstudied object could 
have been removed from the country before the effective date of any 
government ownership statute. 105 Proving an archaeological mate-
rial was illegally removed and hence "stolen" under the NSPA is a 
more complex and difficult procedure than proving a normal com-
mercial good to have been stolen. 106 No American statutory solution 
can correct this problem of lack of study of archaeological materi-
als. to1 
100. United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154, 1154 (9th Cir. 1974). In Hollinshead, 
since Guatemalan law was more stringent than Honduran law, the origin of the article in 
question was crucial to determine whether the object was stolen. 
101. See 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977) . See note 38, supra. 
102. See note 2 supra. The existence of small, portable art objects such as statuettes, 
clay tablets, jewelry, and vases compounds the problem . The portability and sheer volume 
of these art objects makes them difficult to discover and trace while in transit. 
103. The Mayan culture spanned many of the present nations of Central America and 
Mexico. This has resulted in present difficulties in attributing unstudied Mayan materials 
to a specific source nation. See, e.g., K. MEYER, supra note 2, at 15. 
Trade is an additional source of legitimate doubt as to provenance of cultural materials. 
For instance, there were trade exchanges among Old World civilizations such as the Hittites 
and Egyptians, the Minoans and the Mycenaeans of Greece and even between the Mycen-
aeans and the contemporary Western Europeans. See R. EHRICH, CHRONOLOGIES IN OLD 
WORLD ARCHAEOLOGY (1965). 
104. See 545 F.2d at 1000. See note 74 supra. 
105. E.g., 545 F.2d at 1001. See K. MEYER, supra note 2, at 15 (describing an art dealer 
who explained that he would escape the 1970 UNESCO Convention rules by convincing 
royalty to swear that antiquities the dealer sold had been in their family collections for 
centuries). 
106. Blakey & Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 1516, 1602. It is difficult to identify stolen 
property under any circumstances, but especially so when a fence sells the goods to unsus-
pecting customers, thus effectively destroying the evidence of the theft. "A civil plaintiff 
generally finds it difficult to establish that his property has been converted since receivers 
legitimize and dispose of the goods rapidly." Id. 
107. International cataloging and study of cultural materials will increase buyers' and 
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2. THE UNSTUDIED NATURE OF ARCHAEOLOGICAL MATERIALS 
INCREASES SCIENTER PROOF PROBLEMS 
99 
Once the correct ownership laws have been identified and the 
property has been characterized as stolen, conviction under the 
NSPA still requires proof of scienter: that the defendant knew the 
cultural material was stolen 108 or inferred the theft from the circum-
stances.109 The special characteristics of unstudied materials make 
meeting the burden of proof on this issue quite difficult. 110 Signifi-
cant academic ambiguity concerning an artifact's country of origin 
or date of initial private ownership or export reduces the likelihood 
that an individual defendant had the necessary scienter indepen-
dently of a confession. 111 
Those persons who actually remove archaeological goods and 
traffic in thefu quite likely meet the scienter standards. The NSPA 
generally will not reach these persons, however, because they often 
lack the minimal contacts with the United States needed to be· 
subject to American jurisdiction. 112 As the connection between the 
final holder and the original thief becomes more tenuous, the likeli-
hood that the holder of cultural materials knew, or more impor-
tantly, the likelihood that such knowledge can be proven, dimin-
ishes.113 Even archaeologists and other experts may only suspect 
that an object is stolen. 114 Indeed, in the only three NSPA convic-
tions involving movement of foreign origin archaeological materials, 
either public descriptions of the object were enough to strongly 
imply knowledge of the theft or the defendants admitted that they 
knew the objects were stolen. 115 
governments' ability to identify stolen materials. B. BURNHAM, THE ART CRISIS 27 (1975) ("Art 
recoveries result more often from recognition of a stolen object when it is offered for sale than 
from tracking a thief.") . Local foreign national thieves will theoretically be affected by effec-
tive prosecution of archaeological thefts because such enforcement is likely to diminish their 
market. 
108. The NSPA requires that the defendant knew that the goods had been stolen, con-
verted, or taken by fraud. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315 (1976). See, e.g., United States v. Tan-
nuzzo, 174 F.2d 177, 180 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 815 (1949). For a discussion of the 
scienter requirement, see Blakey & Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 1558. 
109. United States v. Werner, 160 F.2d 438, 441-42 (2d Cir. 1947). 
110. One source has characterized proof of scienter as the chief difficulty in applying the 
NSPA effectively. Comment, supra note 3, at 59. 
111. See notes 77-80 & 99-105 supra and accompanying texts. 
112. See note 97 supra. 
113. Blakey & Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 1562 (a master fence is well insulated from 
leaving detectable direct evidence that can be used to establish the requisite state of mind). 
114. The line between "knowing" and "suspecting" would be decided by a court as a 
mens rea proof question . 
115. See note 25 supra and the text accompanying notes 28-40 supra. 
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Confusion over the kind of knowledge necessary to meet the 
NSPA scienter requirement further hinders enforcement. The re-
quirement can be interpreted to require one of two different kinds 
of knowledge: knowledge that the article was illegally exported from 
a country, or knowledge that the property was taken from an actual 
owner. 116 These two interpretations differ substantially. As dis-
cussed in the introduction, illegal export is normally a separate 
crime from stealing from an owner. 117 Application of the NSPA is 
predicated on the existence of property stolen from an owner; expor-
tation is irrelevant except as evidence of theft in the case of nation-
ally owned materials. Mere scienter of illegal export would not nec-
essarily ensure that the defendant knew the object was "stolen" 
from an owner, a basic element in the American definition of 
theft. 118 A scienter interpretation requiring only "knowing that the 
material was exported illegally" would broaden the reach of the 
NSPA. However, such an interpretation would weaken the major 
safeguard, scienter, against unjust convictions in the United States 
for foreign situs acts which the McClain court cited in support of 
the use of foreign ownership laws and the broad American definition 
of theft in enforcing the NSPA. 119 
The unstudied nature of archaeological materials and the 
NSPA's stringent scienter requirement limit the capacity of the 
NSPA to convict all the people involved in the illicit movement of 
cultural materials. A weaker scienter standard alone cannot cure 
the deficiency and creates the spectre of unjust convictions in addi-
tion. This suggests that to better control the illicit movement of 
archaeological materials in the United States there is a need for, in 
addition to increased worldwide study of cultural materials, a legal 
116. United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977), did not reach this issue. 
United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974), reached but did not settle the 
issue. The Hollinshead court, however, held that the defendant need not know the actual law 
of the place of the theft so long as the property was stolen and he or she knew it was stolen . 
495 F.2d at 1154. On its facts Hollinshead was an easy case, distinguishable from cases 
involving the theft of unstudied materials. In Hollinshead, the stele was a well-known, magni-
ficent stele cut into 19 pieces and exported under circumstances which led the McClain court 
to comment that "[a]nyone would have known that it was stolen." 545 F.2d at 1001 n.28. 
The applicable foreign concepts of ownership for the stele were comparable to the general 
American concepts of ownership. In McClain, however, the foreign and American concepts 
of ownership were not necessarily comparable, and the case was remanded to determine the 
ownership issue before reaching the scienter issue. 
117. In the case of theft from a nation allowing only internal private ownership, illegal 
export and theft coincide. See, e.g. , 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977); notes 45-48 supra and 
accompanying text. 
118. See 545 F.2d at 995; Macrory, supra note 9, at 23. 
119. 545 F.2d at 1001-2 n.30 ("the specific scienter requirement eliminates the possibility 
that a defendant is convicted for an offense he could not have understood to exist"). 
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tool with a minimal or no scienter requirement instead of applying 
the NSPA. 
3. THE ORIGINS OF UNSTUDIED MATERIALS CAN EASILY BE FALSIFIED 
To avoid conviction for possessing stolen materials, a person 
has an incentive to obscure the origin of property that has been 
stolen. When the stolen property is cultural material, this problem 
has critical importance. Any obscurance of cultural information is 
intellectually costly and a major element in the overall problem of 
illicit movement of foreign origin archaeological materials. The true 
origin of unstudied cultural materials can be easily concealed. 120 
When similar cultural materials are found in several modern coun-
tries with varying national laws defining ownership of cultural ma-
terials, the problem of concealment of the origins of cultural materi-
als is acute. For example, many Central American nations have 
archaeological materials similar to Mexico's that are being moved 
illicitly in similar manners to the same markets. 121 Some individuals 
smuggle archaeological materials from country to country in order 
to fake provenance or otherwise benefit from more lenient laws. 122 
For instance, the old Mexican antiquities statutes123 were more leni-
ent than the present Guatemalan statute, which dates from 194 7. m 
Thus, artifacts originating in Guatemala and moved after 1947, but 
attributed to Mexico before 1972 would not be "stolen" under the 
NSP A. 125 A person need only forge documents or other evidence to 
support allegations of ownership before the effective dates of restric-
tive statutes. Once this has been done, and the materials can not 
be proven to be stolen, the holders will escape prosecution under the 
NSPA. 126 For example, one art dealer was going to have members 
of royal families swear that various antiquities had been in their 
family collections for centuries. 127 
The NSPA, therefore, effectively puts a premium on the falsifi-
cation and destruction of the history of cultural materials and even 
the mutilation of readily recognizable objects. The incentives thus 
created contravene common sense and the express goal of numerous 
120. See notes 103 and 105 supra. 
121. See K. MEYER, supra note 2, at 240. 
122. 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974). 
123. 545 F.2d at 997-1000. 
124. See B. BURNHAM, supra note 18, at 85. 
125. See note 25 supra and text accompanying notes 33-40. 
126. See, e.g., 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977) . See note 105 supra. 
127. K. MEYER, supra note 2, at 15. See note 105 supra and accompanying text. 
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international efforts 1211-the protection of cultural materials. 1211 But, 
no solution involving penalties for possession or handling recogniza-
ble property can avoid this problem. 1:io 
III. CIVIL REMEDIES ARE MORE EFFICIENT THAN 
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS TO CONTROL THE ILLICIT 
MOVEMENT OF ARCHAEOLOGICAL MATERIALS IN THE 
UNITED STA TES 
Civil action recovery of stolen property provides an effective 
additional deterrent to the importation of, and trade in, illegally 
moved cultural materials. 1:i1 A foreign government can generally 
judicially recover stolen property that it locates in the United States 
only by bringing a civil action for recovery, t:12 even though a criminal 
conviction of theft or for handling "stolen materials" may have a 
collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent civil action to recover the 
property .1:i:i Property "stolen" under criminal law is "stolen" for 
civil recovery purposes, thus the same problems in ascertaining the 
stolen nature of foreign origin archaeological materials under the 
NSPA will be important in civil recovery and damages cases. The 
foreign government can, of course, purchase the artifact from a will-
ing seller or in the case of special bilateral agreements, such as the 
United States-Mexico Treaty, m request the United States govern-
ment to intercede on its behalf in recovery actionsY" The scarcity 
of reported cases suggests a greater reliance on private negotiations 
than on judicial relief in recovering important cultural property .1:w 
128. See, e.g., 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 13; United States-Mexico Treaty, 
supra note 16. 
129. In addition, regardless of whether the criminal is caught and punished, once the 
initial, unstudied movement takes place, the cultural damage is done . See notes 6-7 supra 
and accompanying text. 
130. See Fishman & Metzger, Protecting America's Cultural and Historical Patrimony , 
4 SvR. J. INT'L L. & CoM. 57, 69 (1976). 
131. Blakey & Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 1601. 
132. See, e.g., Guatemala v. Hollinshead, No. 6771 (Super. Ct. Los Angeles, Cal., filed 
Dec. 29, 1971) , reprinted in F. FELDMAN & S. WEIL, ART WORKS: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE 597-
609 (1974). 
133. Blakey & Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 1604 n.481. Most courts have rejected exten-
sion of a collateral estoppel effect to subsequent civil cases because of the absence of mutual-
ity. However, some jurisdictions have not followed this reasoning, and have allowed prior 
criminal judgments to be admitted into evidence in civil cases. FED. R. Evm. 803 (22), 
Advisory Committee notes, at 132 (West 1975) . 
134. See note 16-17 supra. 
135. See note 17 supra and accompanying text; Comment, supra note 3, at 60, 65. 
136. Comment, supra note 3, at 60. 
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The standard civil conversion action in state courtm allows the for-
eign state, in cases in which it can successfully assert ownership of 
the stolen property, to recover the property without compensating 
the current holder, m thus providing its own incentives for applica-
tion and a deterrent to handling stolen property. 1:i11 
A. Civil Recovery Is Preferable to Criminal Sanctions 
Civil recovery suits are preferable to criminal actions in the 
area of illicit movement of archaeological materials for three basic 
reasons: (1) civil sanctions encourage victims to sue converters, thus 
increasing the chances of discovering the various persons in the 
chain from owner to holder and thereby increasing the costs to the 
thieves, in avoiding suit and in the increased resulting penalties; (2) 
civil sanctions are more broadly applied than criminal sanctions 
and therefore may reach some persons not otherwise reachable by 
criminal sanctions; and (3) most of the constitutional protections 
allowed a criminal defendant are not allowed a civil defendant, thus 
the civil plaintiff is favored over the prosecutor in sanctioning hold-
ers of stolen materials. 140 The plaintiff need only prove ownership to 
have the material returned; scienter need not be proved. 141 The in-
137. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 496 (West Supp. 1977); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
621 B (West Supp. 1977). There is no federal statute providing for civil recovery of stolen 
property. 
138. In most American jurisdictions recovery is possible under the common law grounds 
of conversion; a bona fide purchaser who receives goods from one who has stolen them, or 
merely has no power to transfer them, becomes a converter when he takes possession. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 229, Comment h (1965). 
139. Successful recovery from private collectors by countries of origin would undermine 
the economic safety of investing in antiquities. This "would have a chilling effect on the 
security-conscious investors who stimulate the smuggling of the finest pieces." Comment, 
supra note 3, at 63. 
State laws providing for the recovery of stolen property by the rightful owner generally 
do not require that the holder know that an object is stolen before requiring return to its 
owner. Id., at 59. See Schumann-Heink & Co., Inc. v. United States Nat. Bank, 108 Cal. App. 
223, 230, 291 P. 684, 686 (1930) (a mere thief cannot pass title to stolen articles). See, e.g., 
UCC § 2-403 (1972 version); CAL. CoM. CODE § 2403 (West Supp. 1977). 
140. Blakey & Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 1601. In addition, civil recovery suits do not 
involve problems of legislative history or potential interference with the operations of the 
State Department. Such problems are common with respect to the application of the NSPA 
in this area. 
141. Blakey & Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 1602. A successful civil recovery suit entitles 
the plaintiff to recover the property or the fair market value of the property at the time and 
place of conversion. D. Doses, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9, at 403 (1973); c. 
McCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 123, at 463 (1935). However, because of 
the problem in proving that the defendant stole goods other than those in the defendant's 
possession, the plaintiffs recovery is practically limited to the market value of the goods 
actually in the defendant's possession. Blakey & Goldsmith, supra, at 1602. 
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creased likelihood of penalty, due to the deletion of the scienter 
requirement, may make civil recovery a more meaningful deterrent 
to trafficking of cultural materials in the United States than the 
NSPA presently is. 142 
This forced return of commercially valuable cultural materials 
may be, in itself, an adequate encouragement to museums, art deal-
ers, and private collectors to deal much more carefully with archaeo-
logical materials. In United States v. Hollinshead, •4:1 for example, 
while the government was getting a criminal conviction with a fine 
of $5,000, the government of Guatemala settled a civil action for the 
return of the stele. The value of the stele was allegedly over 
$200,000.1 44 Successful recoveries hopefully will cause buyers and 
sellers of cultural materials in general to be more alert to the prove-
nance of the archaeological materials they handle. Perhaps the sell-
ers may be forced by market pressure to document by warranty the 
provenance in some manner acceptable to the buyers. Such indirect 
deterrence may also slow the initial movement of the antiquities not 
reachable directly by United States statutes. 
The basic initial result is the return of the object to the owner. 
But, additionally, over a series of successful recoveries of cultural 
materials, a corpus of evidence may be developed on which success-
ful NSPA convictions may be based. 145 For instance, identifiable 
dissatisfied customers may be the first step toward determining a 
pattern of activity of one or more illicit transporters of archaeologi-
cal materials. Thus, despite the problems discussed below, civil 
recovery is probably a more efficient general use of United States 
Government resources than application of the NSPA at this time to 
control the illicit movement of foreign origin archaeological materi-
als. 
B. Some of the Same Limitations of the NSPA Apply to Civil 
Remedies 
Unfortunately, civil recovery too has some limitations. The 
basic limitation of the preponderance of unstudied cultural materi-
142. See note 139 supra. 
143. 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1972). 
144. Answer in Guatemala v. Hollinshead, No. 6771 , paragraph VIII (Super. Ct. Los 
Angeles, Cal., filed Dec. 29, 1971), reprinted in F. FELDMAN & S. WEIL, ART WORKS: LAW, 
POLICY, PRACTICE 597, 603 (1974). 
145. See Blakey & Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 1607 ("plaintiffs' attorneys may supply 
law enforcement officials with information to help convict receivers in the hope of benefitting 
hy collateral estoppel from a criminal prosecution"). 
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als often prevents the recognition of property as stolen and the 
determination of its provenance. 1411 As noted under the NSPA, no 
American action alone can alleviate this limitation which leaves 
criminal and civil remedies, as national efforts, second best to inter-
national solutions. 
Civil suits are rarely brought because they are expensive, time-
consuming, and possibly embarassing for a foreign nation to bring 
in United States courts. 147 Guatemala v. Hollinshead vividly illus-
trates the problem with pursuing a civil remedy . 1411 The facts are the 
same as those of the Hollinshead facts recounted in the introduc-
tion. This civil suit to recover the stele, filed in 1971, was finally 
dismissed on October 19, 1976; the stele was returned to Guatemala. 
On the other hand, McClain involved many undescribed small ar-
chaeological materials. 149 No civil action to recover the items has yet 
been brought. The United States could partially alleviate these 
problems by encouraging civil reovery actions by agreeing, in gen-
eral or specifically in treaties, to represent national or private own-
ers of stolen cultural property in civil actions for recovery. Such is 
the case for specific types of monuments and particularly important 
studied artifacts under the United States-Mexico Treaty150 and the 
United States customs regulations dealing with pre-Columbian 
monuments. 151 No changes in the normal burden of proof or Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure need be attempted, nor are any likely to 
be politically acceptable in the United States at this time; each 
plaintiff should be bound to prove his ownership before recovery is 
allowed. 
Normally, theft victims merely recover from their insurance 
companies, which then pass the costs along to a larger risk pool 
rather than agressively pursuing the thieves. 152 Thus, normally the 
deterrence expected from private law enforcement is not realized. 15:1 
This avenue of recovery is not available to foreign nations whose 
146. Blakey & Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 1516, 1602. See notes 99-107 supra and 
accompanying text. 
147. SENATE REPORT, IMPORTATION, supra note 11; Nafziger, Controlling, supra note 3, at 
73. See Rogers & Cohen, supra note 25, at 322; Comment, supra note 3, at 53 ("The possibility 
of retrieval by the country of origin depends on its ability to discover the whereabouts of the 
pieces, prove a claim that the object originated within its borders, and that it was exported 
in violation of its laws, or was stolen."). 
148. See note 132 supra and accompanying text. 
149. 545 F.2d at 992 ("terracotta figures and pottery, beads, and a few stucco pieces"). 
150. See note 17 supra. 
151. See note 92 supra. 
152. Blakey & Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 1602. 
153. Id. at 1603. 
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archaeological materials have been stolen, because they, as a rule, 
hold no insurance on unstudied, unexcavated archaeological materi-
als and there is no insured pool to absorb the risks. Further, as noted 
above, the initial movement of archeological materials causes irre-
mediable intellectual losses. These arguments point to the desirabil-
ity of the employment of civil remedies for remedying the damages 
to the extent feasible and developing a corpus of information and 
pattern of enforcement to deter the initial destructive acts. 
C. Other United States Government Interventions to Promote 
Civil Sanctions 
Other American interventions that might be politically accept-
able include encouraging civil recovery actions through the statu-
tory award of legal fees from the losing party, for at least the plain-
tiff as a private attorney general, 154 or either party if prevailing in 
such a civil recovery suit. Similarly, the United States Government 
could underwrite awards of legal fees for successful plaintiffs in such 
actions. Both measures would be designed especially to encourage 
civil suits to recover less valuable stolen properties which might not 
normally warrant the necessary expenditures of legal fees and costs 
to recover. By making the loser pay the winner's costs of litigation, 
as well as forfeit the item if the holder loses, an added incentive to 
research provenance carefully before buying or Ii tiga ting possession 
is provided. The other side of the argument is that any such incen-
154. For a discussion of the history and details of the private attorney general exemption 
to the rule that each party absorbs his costs of litigation, see Note, Attorney Fee Awards and 
the Public-Interest Litigant, 65 KENTUCKY L.J. 562 (1976). Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. 
Wilderness Society, •21 U.S. 240 (1975), held that express congressional authorization was 
needed for courts to award attorney's fees to plaintiffs in "private attorney general cases." 
A reasonable statute applicable to civil cases involving movement of foreign origin stolen 
archaeological materials would be: 
Unless contrary to existing statutory provision or considerations of justice de-
mand otherwise, the court shall award reasonable attorneys' fees to a prevailing party 
whose status as a private attorney general under this statute has been established. 
To be considered a private attorney general, a party by carrying on his lawsuit must 
have (1) conferred a substantial benefit on the public or a significant class thereof, 
and (2) substantially vindicated an important public right or policy whose full effec-
tuation of necessity depends both upon private vindication and an award of fees to 
make such private vindication economically feasible. 
Note, supra at 590 (the elements of this proposed statute are reasonably discussed throughout 
the Note). 
For a discussion of the awarding of reasonable attorney's fees and other reasonable 
expenses for participation in proceedings before federal regulatory agencies and for other 
purposes, see Public Participation in Government Proceedings: Act of 1976: Hearings on S. 
2715 before the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). 
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tives must be carefully controlled so as not to encourage an undue 
number of suits whose sole or basic intent is to harrass particular 
individuals. 
A second potential intervention is the development of a federal 
civil damages recovery statute or the application of state civil dam-
ages recovery statutes. 155 This cause of action is rarely successful 
because of the difficulties in establishing the requisite aggravated 
state of mind. 156 The Model Theft and Fencing Act157 provides an 
example of a possible federal civil damages recovery statute, based 
on the federal antitrust statutes. The Model Act attempts to encour-
age the realization of the deterrence value of private enforcement by 
financial incentives, yet minimize the inequities of excessive liabil-
ity .158 The Model Act would impose civil liability for damages if the 
plaintiff establishes the receipt or handling of stolen property, req-
uisite scienter, and the ownership of the property by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. Preponderance of the evidence represents a 
significant reduction from the level of proof required under criminal 
law, "beyond a reasonable doubt," and thus enables more convert-
ers to be sanctioned civilly than under criminal laws. 1511 lt is of course 
possible for a defendant convicted of a violation of the NSPA to also 
be sued civilly for return of the stolen property or its fair market 
value, as well as for civil damages. The Model Act would give collat-
eral estoppel effect to issues resolved in criminal actions in subse-
quent civil cases as an incentive to ensure the bringing of civil 
actions after criminal actions. As a further incentive to the bringing 
of civil actions for damages, the Model Act would allow treble dam-
ages (actual damages including consequential and incidental 
losses), reasonable attorney's fees, and costs of investigation and 
litigation. 160 The treble damages and attorney's fee feature suggest 
that if the Act were passed, a significant growth of private attorney's 
specializing in recoveries of archaeological materials would occur .161 
155. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 496 (West Supp. 1977); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-621 B 
(West Supp. 1977). Both statutes subject criminal receivers to civil liability for treble dam-
ages, court costs and reasonable attorney's fees. 
156. Blakey & Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 1602. See D. Doses, supra note 141, § 3.9, 
at 205; w. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 9-10 (4th ed. 1971). 
157. Reprinted as Appendix Bin Blakey & Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 1620-26. The 
act is discussed in fair detail in Blakey & Goldsmith, supra, at 1603-08. 
158. Blakey & Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 1606. 
159. Id. at 1603. 
160. Model Theft and Fencing Act § 10, reprinted in Blakey & Goldsmith, supra note 
41, at 1624. 
161. Blakey & Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 1607. 
31
Nowell: American Tools
Published by SURFACE, 1978
108 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol.6:77 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Archaeological materials illicitly removed from foreign coun-
tries continue to be moved in great quantities in the United States 
despite several international efforts to control the problem. The 
United States Government has expended significant efforts in two 
cases seeking criminal convictions under the NSPA of Americans 
accused of transporting archaeological materials illegally in the 
United States. This article suggests that government resources may 
be better focused in assisting foreign nations to recover the stolen 
property by United States Government assisted civil suits. 
NSPA prosecutions offer the hope of quick and relatively inex-
pensive deterrence of the illicit movement of cultural materials. The 
only two reported court cases brought under the NSPA suggest, 
however, that because the NSPA is jurisdictionally limited to the 
United States, its effective range of application is limited. Peculiar 
enforcement difficulties in proving archaeological materials to be 
stolen and known to be stolen further limit its usefulness to only the 
most easily proven cases of illicit movement of archaeological mate-
rials. 
From the start, the NSPA is a second best solution since the 
best solution to the international problem logically involves interna-
tional cooperation, which as yet has not materialized. The NSPA 
alone cannot deter effectively the basic and most important damage 
caused by the illicit movement of cultural materials; the irreparable 
loss of cultural information that occurs when the object is first 
moved from its natural setting. Instead, the NSPA as a national 
statute focuses on the movement of the antiquities across United 
States borders and state lines182 after the bulk of the irreparable 
damage has been done.183 The Act's criminal penalties, like any 
penalty, may encourage the material's physical destruction or the 
obfuscation of its provenance, both to the greater detriment of 
society than normally experienced with destruction of stolen, mod-
ern, replaceable goods. 
Finally, the McClain court's present broad interpretation of the 
NSPA may hamper future State Department efforts to achieve 
effective international agreements in this area by narrowing their 
162. See notes 5-7 & 25 supra and accompanying text. Recent United States Customs 
regulations, and to a lesser extent the United States-Mexico Treaty, also focus on the interna-
tional movement of archaeological materials. See notes 92 and 16-17 supra. 
163. See note 6 supra and accompanying text. 
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negotiating room. 164 The NSPA, as interpreted in McClain, can not 
be improved significantly by amendment because of its inherent 
limitations when applied to the movement of archaeological materi-
als in the United States. McClain has applied the very broad Ameri-
can definition of theft. No amendments to the NSPA can change 
foreign standards of ownership nor the general inability to positively 
identify unstudied cultural materials as stolen or determine their 
provenance. An amendment could reduce the scienter requirement 
from knowledge of the "stolen" nature of the item, but such an 
amendment would not be in keeping with general American crimi-
nal law and would presumably be very difficult to pass. Thus, the 
NSPA should not be amended, but should only be applied in the 
most easily proven cases of theft. Rather, domestic legislative and 
legal assistance efforts should be applied toward encouraging civil 
recovery of stolen cultural property. 
No simple solution to the complex illicit movement of archaeo-
logical materials problem exists. Any alternative solution necessar-
ily must contain elements of weakness in common with NSPA ap-
plication, 165 especially those stemming from the abundance of un-
studied archaeological materials. 
Practical immediate American efforts to help control the illicit 
removal of archaeological materials can involve several different 
directions. First, all likely solutions to the problem will depend on 
increased study of the cultural materials to enable them to be iden-
tified as missing, traced to their present location and recognized as 
stolen. Increased American support of existing national and interna-
tional programs of study could reduce this obstacle to the effective 
control of illicit movement of cultural materials. Second, civil recov-
ery of cultural materials is a much more broadly applicable Ameri-
can tool than the NSPA to sanction the illicit movement of cultural 
materials in the United States, because civil recovery does not re-
quire the proof of scienter that the object was stolen. Shift of em-
phasis of United States Government support from criminal 
cases to civil recovery of stolen cultural materials may then produce 
a greater deterrent of the illicit movement of cultural materials. 
Third, the best solution to the entire problem of movement of cul-
tural materials lies in extensive international cooperation. The 
164. See notes 91-95 supra and accompanying text. 
165. For instance, any criminal or civil penalty for the illegal possession of cultural 
materials provides an incentive to falsify or destroy the history and identity of cultural 
materials of questionable or illegal origin. 
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United States and other art-importing countries have yet to ratify 
the 1970 UNESCO Convention and pass the necessary enabling 
legislation. The United States can actively work to make the 
UNESCO conventions operative and effective. In the interim, im-
mediate, but limited progess can be pursued via bilateral and re-
gional international agreements. 
34
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 6, No. 1 [1978], Art. 4
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol6/iss1/4
